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Abstract
We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a sta-
tistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense
that the weighted sum of payments and estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad
range of estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and, under some ad-
ditional assumptions, ridge regression. It also generalizes to several objectives, including minimizing
estimation error subject to budget constraints. Besides our concrete results for regression problems, we
contribute a mechanism design framework through which to design and analyze statistical estimators
whose examples are supplied by workers with cost for labeling said examples.
1 Introduction
Statistical estimation, from data, of the parameters of a model of reality, is the spirit, essence, and workhorse
of modern science and business. In today’s complex world of science and industry, data for an estimator
deployed by a particular research group or enterprise is often provided by other entities; furthermore, the
quality of the data is crucial for the accuracy of the estimator, and can vary widely. It is reasonable to assume
that, with appropriate effort and cost, the providers of the data can improve the quality of their data — but
of course they may lack incentive to do so. Crowdsourcing [9] can be seen as a popular and widespread
instantiation of the phenomenon.
The situation is not unlike Mechanism Design, a well developed field in Mathematical Economics [32],
and indeed related problems in connection to crowdsourcing have been recently treated within this frame-
work; see the references in the next subsection. In Mechanism Design, in order for the interaction of the
designer with several rational strategic agents to be as beneficial as possible, a game between the agents is
created in which the pursuit by the agents of individual advantage leads to the optimum outcome for the
designer. Perhaps the archetypical Mechanism Design problem, solved in Myerson’s celebrated work [34],
is how to auction an item to a number of agents, whose values for the item are unknown but drawn from
known prior distributions. Myerson’s is a powerful, sophisticated, and clean result, and has had tremendous
impact—a useful ideal to keep in mind when venturing into new areas.
Coming back to estimation, suppose that a Statistician has an algorithm which, given appropriate data
points X = {(xi, yi)}, approximates an unknown function f that captures an important aspect of reality,
and can be usefully employed in prediction. For concreteness, let us say that the unknown function is linear
and the context is one-dimensional linear regression (noting that our results are far more general). The
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quality of the output of the algorithm, fˆ , depends crucially on the quality of the data X. If the data is poor,
the Statistician’s prediction fˆ(x∗)—where x∗ is the unknown test point where a prediction will have to be
made—will be off the mark. Assume that the loss suffered is (f(x∗) − fˆ(x∗))2. How can the Statistician
incentivize her data sources — suppose for simplicity that each of them provides one of the (xi, yi) points,
for an xi selected by the Statistician — to work hard so as to supply high-quality data?
Assume that each data provider is a “worker” who, by expending effort e, achieves a level of quality
of the data; the larger e, the higher the quality. To fix ideas, assume that, by expending effort e, the ith
worker is able to sample a distribution for his target data yi that is centered at the true value f(xi) and has
variance σi(e)2. That is, the variance of the error of the datapoint is our measure of the worker’s quality
(rather, lack thereof). Of course there are many workers, and they may have different functions σi(e). We
assume that these functions are common knowledge to the participants, including of course the Statistician.1
The question we explore is this: Can the Statistician create a mechanism—or protocol, or contract—which
incentivizes through appropriate payments the workers to supply high-quality data? We assume, naturally
enough, that each worker acts so as to minimize the expectation of effort exerted minus payment received.
(By rescaling, we can assume that units of loss by the Statistician, effort by a worker, and currency all
coincide). Naturally, this expectation must be nonnegative, because otherwise the worker will refuse to
work.
The Statistician, of course, does not see the effort exerted by the ith worker, but only the result yi of
this effort. Evidently, the payment in the protocol, or contract, being designed should be determined by
comparing each supplied yi to the true value f(xi). But of course this is impossible because we will never
learn f(·). The payments must somehow depend on what we know, which is the data, the algorithm, the
quality functions of the workers, and the prior of the test point x∗, but importantly not f .
And what should such a mechanism aspire to achieve? Let us define an ideal performance which, a
priori, may seem unreasonably optimistic. The quality of our estimation is going to depend on the following:
• the set W of workers that we select from the available workers;
• the set {xi : i = 1, . . . , |W |} of the regression points we choose to assign to each of them;
• on the effort ei each worker decides to invest (which is out of our control).
Once these have been determined, then we also know the variance σi(ei)2 of each data point, and
the expectation of the loss to the statistician is a known function L(W, {xi}, {ei}). Define OPT to be the
minimum, over all possible W, {xi}, {ei}, of the quantity L(W, {xi}, {ei})+
∑
i∈W ei.
2 That is, OPT is the
optimum of loss plus effort, what is known in Economics as the social optimum (best possible sum of costs
by all participants). But OPT is also a lower bound on the total cost (loss plus payments) to the Statistician:
To achieve total cost OPT, the Statistician must convince each worker to supply the precise optimum effort,
and to do so at zero surplus, that is, by being paid the smallest possible amount for this effort (recall that the
worker will refuse to work if payment minus effort has negative expectation). But this is hard to achieve,
given that the efforts exerted by the workers are not observable and out of the Statistician’s control.
So, is there such a mechanism? In the light of the difficulties outlined in the last two paragraphs, the
situation may seem quite hopeless.
Very surprisingly, we show that such a mechanism does exist not only for linear regression, but also for a
broad class of estimators satisfying a simple and intuitive condition, and includes, for example, polynomial
regression, finite dimensional kernel regression and many other linear estimators. The solution engages
workers in a game not with the Statistician, but with each other. The game is constructed in such a way that,
1In fact, as it will become clear, each worker needs to know this information only to decide whether to participate in the
mechanism, and not to decide on his optimum effort level.
2We can handle much more than this objective, as discussed later in this section.
2
in the end, the optimum outcome is achieved, in that loss plus payments is minimized, and all “surplus” of
the workers is extracted (that is, no worker is paid more than his work).
One important consideration is what we mean above by “in the end,” that is, what are our assumptions
on how workers will behave? What is our solution concept? After all, solution concepts are known to
be delicate and fragile, the subject of endless discussions and controversy in Game Theory. It turns out
that our design can afford a solution concept that is extremely robust and uncontroversial: Each worker’s
decision is a unique dominant strategy, that is, it is the unique action that optimizes the worker’s objective
(payment minus effort) no matter what anybody else does. Of course, this restricts severely the design space
of mechanisms that we can employ, and despite this restriction we can still still design a mechanism that
attains the ideal total cost OPT.
One key idea of the mechanism is that, in the game as defined, the payment of each worker depends on
the data supplied by the other workers. To some this may seem unreasonable, while to others it may seem
a bit unsurprising in view of the VCG mechanism, among others, which has a similar structure [45, 6, 13].
That this maneuver works in this instance is an entirely new phenomenon related to statistical estimation, as
opposed to mechanism design, and comes with a different mathematical justification, even though in a sense
it does have the same roots as VCG: Our design essentially creates a race for accuracy, in which workers
compete knowing that they will fare badly if left behind.
Our mechanism applies to all statistical estimators that satisfy a certain intuitive property: The expec-
tation of the estimator’s loss depends only on the data points {xi} and the distribution of the test point x∗,
and depends on the yi’s only through their variances. There are two variants of the problem, depending
on how the xi’s are determined. So far, we have assumed that the xi’s should be optimally chosen by the
algorithm/mechanism, and the estimators we can handle already include, e.g., linear regression, polynomial
regression, finite-dimensional kernel regression, and several other linear estimators. In a model where the
xi’s are fixed and given in advance (but the algorithm should still optimally assign them to workers) the sit-
uation is even more favorable: our technique applies to an even broader class of estimators, including ridge
regression [44]. This is discussed in Section 3.2. In the same section, we also discuss several extensions
of our results. Besides a weighted combination of loss plus payments, we can accommodate objectives that
aim at minimizing loss subject to budget constraints, or loss plus a function of the payments, and can also
go beyond mean square error to other loss functions.
1.1 Related Work
For background in statistical analysis and estimation see, e.g., [15], and for mechanism design see, e.g., [32].
In the past few years there have been several papers treating crowdsourcing in a framework that is at least
superficially similar to ours. [16] gauge through experiments the elasticity of effort under pay in crowd-
sourcing, while [14] use learning algorithms to find the optimum crowdsourcing contract, and [39] add
experts to the crowd so non-experts perform better. Scheduling mechanisms are used to manipulate the time
behavior of the crowd [38, 30], whereas [12] use incentives to match workers according to their specializa-
tion. Several papers address strategies to optimize performance keeping within budget [40, 41, 4], while
in [1] the online task assignment problem is treated as a multi-armed bandit under a budget. The optimal
design of non-monetary “prestige” rewards to optimally incentivize the participants is addressed in [18],
and in [33, 19, 43] privacy concerns in data gathering are treated through incentives; also in [42] regret
minimization is used in a crowdsourcing context.
A little closer to our framework, Mechanism Design has been used in [35, 3] to analyze crowdsourcing
contests—in which all workers submit their work and one is selected to be paid—as all-pay auctions. These
mechanisms also use monetary incentives to create a competition between workers to enhance performance,
but their nature and the problems they address are quite different from ours—for example, they are by
design not individually rational. In [8, 27, 28], mechanism design is used for regression and classification
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with strategic data providers. In contrast to our setting, the agents are not interested in being paid for
producing data for the learning task and have no cost for exerting effort. Instead, they control a subset
of the data for which they already have the correct labels, and want to bias the outcome of the learning
process to perform well on their subset of the data. [2] and follow-up papers design proper scoring rules for
principal-agent problems where agents are asked to predict an outcome, but can also influence the outcome
by exerting different levels of effort. In contrast to our setting, agents only care about rewards and have
no cost for effort. More importantly, the designer only cares about how to incentivize the agents to exert
maximum effort, and not how much money is paid to the agents. Moreover, they use the final outcome to
decide rewards (this is common in scoring rules), while we never learn f(x∗). [7] design mechanisms for
crowdsourced binary labeling, where a collection of agents are asked to provide binary labels to a collection
of tasks, and the designer wants to incentivize them via monetary rewards to exert maximum effort for each
task. The agents’ strategy consists on how much effort to exert for each task they are allocated (where
increased effort increases their cost but also the probability of correct labeling), and whether to truthfully
report the labels of their allocated tasks. Besides being for a different learning task, the biggest difference to
our paper lies in the fact that the designer does not care about how much money is paid to the agents, or the
tradeoff between rewards and accuracy. [29] use scoring rules to incentivize agents whose private signals
are correlated to reveal their private signals. In comparison to our work, the agents’ decision is whether to
report their true private signal or some other signal, but not how much effort to exert to get better quality
signals. Finally, [10] look at a problem close to ours except they assume that each worker cannot affect their
quality (it is sampled from a prior distribution), but only decide whether to participate in the mechanism;
they also only consider the simple unbiased estimator for constant functions from R to R.
Relation to Optimal Contract Theory/Principal-Agent Problems. Our mechanisms achieve in a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium objective value that an omnipotent dictator who could dictate how much
effort each worker exerts would achieve. This is a surprising result that is morally related to results in
optimal contract theory; see, e.g., Chapter 14 of [26]. The question is how to design a contract with a
worker whose effort e affects your revenue π through some conditional density f(π|e). The contract is
a mapping w(·) from your revenue π and the worker’s effort (if it is observable) to the worker’s income
w(π). So your utility is π − w(π), while the worker’s utility is w(π) − g(e), for some function g(·). The
problem is straightforward to formulate when the worker’s effort is observable. The surprising result, which
is reminiscent of our result, is that under appropriate conditions one can design a contract w(·) resulting in
the same utility when the worker’s effort is not observable as if it were observable. While the two results
are related, the setting and techniques are different. Moreover, there are important qualitative differences in
the results. The aforementioned result applies to a single worker, while ours applies to any number. Also,
the worker’s payment, even when his/her effort is not observable, is still a function of the revenue π, which
is exactly observable. Instead, in our setting we do not observe what mean squared error we achieve as
a result of the efforts exerted by the workers. The use of convexity in the payments, that we employ, has
been employed in the design of non-linear contracts [11]. (Many thanks to Preston McAfee for bringing this
paper to our attention.)
Comparison to VCG. The guarantees of our mechanism are also reminiscent to those of the celebrated
VCG mechanism [45, 6, 13]. VCG optimizes social welfare in a dominant strategy equilibrium, achieving
as high a welfare as that of an omniscient algorithm (who knows the bidders’ valuations and can therefore
compute the exactly optimal outcome). While the guarantees of our mechanism are similar to those of
VCG, the technical reasons underlying the two results are different. Importantly, the VCG mechanism
may allow multiple equilibria with worse guarantees. In contrast, our mechanism achieves optimality in
a unique dominant strategy equilibrium. So, in particular, there are no bad equilibria. Moreover, VCG is
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very sensitive to the computational complexity of the underlying algorithmic problem. If the algorithmic
problem is intractable, then so is running VCG, and the VCG mechanism is known to fail if the algorithmic
problem can only be approximated. In contrast, our proposed mechanism is approximation preserving, as
noted in Section 3.1.
2 Estimation with Strategic Workers: the Model
In this section, we introduce the statistical estimation task that we solve in the next section. We start with
some standard definitions.
Definition 1 (Estimator). Let H be a family of functions f : D → R, where D ⊆ Rn. An estimator for
H takes as input a collection (xi, yi)ki=1 of examples (xi, yi) ∈ D × R and produces an estimated function
fˆ(xi,yi)ki=1
∈ H.
For example, H may be the class of linear functions from Rn to R, in which case the estimator could
be linear regression. If the input (xi, yi)ki=1 to the estimator is clear from context, we may omit it from the
subscript of fˆ . Sometimes we use (~x, ~y) as a shorthand for (xi, yi)ki=1, and use fˆ(~x,~y) to denote the estimator.
We may also use the shorthand fˆ−j or fˆ(~x,~y)−j for the output of the estimator when given all examples except
(xj , yj); i.e. fˆ−j , fˆ(xi,yi)i∈{1,...,k}\{j} , fˆ(~x,~y)−j . This is assuming that our estimator is well-defined with
one example omitted. Whenever we use this notation we assume that our estimator satisfies this property.
We call fˆ−j the estimator fˆ with one example less.
In estimation it is usually assumed that the examples are readily available. Here we study the scenario
in which we choose a collection x1, . . . , xk ∈ D of points and assign them to experts, who then return
estimates of the function f at those points. How good will these estimates be? In this paper we assume that
the experts, or workers, are strategic; for example, they will put no effort into producing good estimates of
the function value at their given point, unless they are provided monetary incentives to exert such effort. We
capture the behavior of such strategic experts in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Strategic Worker). Let f ∈ H be as in Definition 1. A worker for f is a strategic agent who,
given some query x ∈ D, will decide how much effort e ∈ E ⊆ R+ to exert in order to produce an estimate
y(e) of f(x).3 The worker:
• is characterized by some known strictly decreasing convex function σ : E → R+ such that, whenever
effort e is exerted, the estimate produced satisfies:
y(e) = f(x) + ǫ,
where ǫ is distributed according to some (potentially unknown) distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ(e)2.
• aims to minimize the amount of exerted effort to produce the estimate of f(x), unless provided
monetary incentives to do otherwise; in particular, if the worker is promised a payment function
p : D × R → R that assigns to each pair (x, y) of a query point x and estimate y a dollar amount
p(x, y), then the worker will choose to exert an amount of effort
e∗ ∈ argmax
e∈E
E[p(x, y(e))] − e,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in y and the randomness in the payment
function, if any.4
3Note that we have omitted the dependence of y on x in our notation to ease notation.
4Note again that we have omitted the dependence of e∗ on x and the payment function p(·) in our notation.
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The following definition formulates the problem of estimating an unknown function f ∈ H, when one’s
only access to f is through strategic workers for f .
Definition 3 (Estimation with Strategic Workers (ESW)). Suppose that we are given:
• an estimator fˆ for a family of functions H, as in Definition 1;
• access to a set W of strategic workers for some unknown function f ∈ H, as in Definition 2, where
each worker i ∈ W has a known function σi mapping effort to accuracy; we also assume that all
workers’ estimations are independent;
• a distribution F over D (the distribution of the test point x∗ ∈ D).
Our goal is to:
1. choose some subset W ′ ⊆ W of workers
2. provide an input xi to each worker i ∈ W ′, requesting an estimate yi of f(xi) from i
3. commit to a payment function pi to each i ∈ W ′, where pi is a (potentially) randomized mapping
pi : (xi, yi)i∈W ′ 7→ R, which may depend not only on the estimate produced by worker i but also
the estimates produced by the other workers.
Subject to our decisions in 1, 2 and 3, we are looking to minimize a weighted average of the mean-square
error of our estimation fˆ and the expected payments made to the workers, namely:
Ex∗,~y(~e∗)
[(
fˆ(~x,~y(~e∗))(x
∗)− f(x∗)
)2
+ η ·
∑
i∈W ′
pi
(
(xj , yj(e
∗
j ))j∈W ′
)]
, (1)
for some η > 0, where the expectation is taken with respect to all the randomness in the setting: the
randomness in x∗ ∼ F , the randomness in the outputs ~y(~e∗) , {yi(e∗i )}i∈W ′ produced by the workers,
and the randomness in the payment functions. For (1) to be a well-defined objective, we need to be able to
predict the efforts (e∗i )i∈W ′ that the workers of our selected set will exert given our decisions for 1, 2 and 3.
We discuss how this can be achieved in Section 2.1 below. At the very least, our prediction needs to satisfy
the individual rationality constraint of Definition 5, i.e. that the expected payment to each worker i is at
least as large as e∗i , otherwise the worker would not participate.
Remark 1 (Variants). 1. In Definition 3, we assume that the designer optimizes over the selection of the
points xi. Alternatively, it could be that each expert i comes with a point xi, which is “his expertise,”
or that the xi’s are predetermined but the designer can still decide how to assign them to experts.
In Section 3.2, we briefly discuss this variant of our problem, which yields a much richer class of
estimators for which our result, described in the next section, applies.
2. We also assumed that the objective is to minimize a weighted average of mean-square error and ex-
pected payments. While we stick to this objective for the development of our mechanism in the next
section, our techniques go through with minimal modifications to much more general objectives. For
example, we can accommodate the problem of minimizing mean-square error subject to a budget con-
straint, or minimizing the sum of mean-square error and an arbitrary increasing function of payments.
We discuss these extensions in Section 3.2.
3. Finally, our technique is general enough to even eliminate the use of mean-square error from the
objective, an extension that we also discuss in Section 3.2.
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2.1 Incentives
We have already noted inside Definition 3 that for (1) to be a well-defined objective, we need to be able to
predict the efforts (e∗i )i∈W ′ that the workers will exert as a result of our solution to ESW. It is important
to note that the form of the payment functions (Decision 3 in Definition 3) couples the decision of each
worker i about the amount of effort he exerts with the amounts of effort the other workers exert (since
these influence ~y−i), which themselves depend on yi and hence the effort that worker i exerts. This cyclical
dependence is familiar in Game Theory. Indeed, any solution to ESW—comprising a subset W ′ of workers,
queries (xi)i∈W ′ to them, and payment commitments (pi)i∈W ′—induces a game among the workers in W ′;
the effort levels (e∗j )j∈W ′ eventually chosen by the workers are the outcome of their strategic interaction in
this game. Therefore, to be able to evaluate (1), we need to predict how agents will behave in this game.
There are numerous solution concepts in Game Theory, whose goal is to close into the possible behavior
of rational players in a game. The prominent ones are Nash equilibrium and its several refinements. How-
ever, Nash equilibria may be randomized and, most problematically, they may be multiple, which would
result into equilibrium selection issues in our setting. To avoid such issues and guarantee robustness of our
solutions, we insist on the most compelling and uncontroversial solution concept, namely that of Unique
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium, defined next.
Definition 4 (Unique Dominant Strategy Equilibrium). A solution to ESW—comprising a subset W ′ of
workers, queries (xi)i∈W ′ , and payment commitments (pi)i∈W ′—induces a unique dominant strategy equi-
librium (e∗i )i∈W ′ iff, for all i ∈ W ′ and all (ej)j∈W ′:
E
[
pi
(
(xi, yi(e
∗
i )), (xj , yj(ej))j∈W ′\{i}
)]
− e∗i ≥ E
[
pi ((xj , yj(ej))j∈W ′
]
− ei,
where the expectation is with respect to everything that is random, with equality only if ei = e∗i . In words,
no matter what effort levels the other workers choose, the unique optimal effort level of every worker i is e∗i .
Note that, if a unique dominant strategy equilibrium exists in a game it is fairly trivial for agents to
decide what strategy to play. We will insist that our solution to ESW should induce a game that has a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium. Note that, in general, it is very rare for a game to have such an outcome, and
consequently this poses a significant constraint on our design. While our main result (Theorem 1) satisfies
this constraint, it nevertheless does not sacrifice any objective value, fairing as well as it would without this
constraint present; see Remark 2 below and the discussion following the statement of Theorem 1.
Finally, as we have already noted in Definition 3, not all combinations of solutions to ESW and pre-
dictions of worker behavior are realistic. Since the workers are assumed strategic and their participation is
voluntary, they should not be making a loss when participating. This is captured by the following definition,
adding an additional requirement to our solutions to ESW.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality). Given a solution to ESW—comprising a subsetW ′ of workers, queries
(xi)i∈W ′ , and payment commitments (pi)i∈W ′ , a collection of efforts (e∗i )i∈W ′ satisfies individual rationality
iff, for all workers i ∈ W ′,
E
[
pi
((
xj , yj(e
∗
j )
)
j∈W ′
)]
− e∗i ≥ 0.
Remark 2 (Robustness vs Optimality Non-Tradeoffs). We have chosen to restrict our attention to solutions
to ESW that induce a game among workers with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium that satisfies in-
dividual rationality. The worry might be that such a strong requirement might sacrifice too much objective
value. We will show that it does not, in a very strong sense. In particular, while this requirement is handicap-
ping our solutions to ESW, we still compare our solution’s performance against any other solution evaluated
at the most favorable for that solution collection (e∗i )i, with the minimum requirement that the (e∗i )i satisfy
the individual rationality constraint.
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3 Optimal Estimation with Strategic Workers: the Mechanism
Our main contribution in this paper is to establish the existence of an optimal solution to ESW, which induces
a unique dominant strategy equilibrium and which has very strong optimality guarantees, as discussed later
in this section, for a broad class of estimators fˆ , containing several familiar ones:
Definition 6. An estimator fˆ for H, as in Definition 1, is well-behaved iff there exists some function g such
that, for all distributions F over D, functions f ∈ H, and vectors ~x ∈ D∗ and ~σ ∈ R∗+ (of the same
dimension as ~x):5
E~y,x∗
[(
fˆ(~x,~y)(x
∗)− f(x∗)
)2]
= g(~x, F, ~σ),
where for the purposes of the expectation on the left hand side x∗ ∼ F and, independently for all i, yi =
f(xi) + ǫi, where each ǫi is sampled from an arbitrary distribution of mean 0 and variance σ2i , (and when
~x is such that fˆ(~x,~y) is well-defined).
Note that several common estimators, such as linear regression, polynomial regression, finite-dimensional
kernel estimation, are well-behaved according to our definition.6
Our main result is the existence of an optimal algorithm for ESW, whenever fˆ is well-behaved, according
to Definition 6, and well-defined with one example less.7 We note that the first condition is a sufficient
condition and discuss how to relax it in Section 3.2. The second condition is necessary for interesting
solutions to ESW, and we discuss how it can be removed by broadening the set of allowable payment
functions in Section 3.2. Our algorithm optimally solves ESW in a rather strong sense, as captured by
Properties 2 and 3 in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists an optimal algorithm for ESW for all well-behaved estimators fˆ that are well-
defined with one example less. The algorithm:
1. produces a solution to ESW that induces a unique dominant strategy equilibrium that satisfies indi-
vidual rationality;
2. under the unique dominant strategy equilibrium the solution achieves objective value (1) that is opti-
mal; in fact, the achieved objective value matches the following quantity:
min
W ′,(xi,ei)i∈W′
(
Ex∗,~y
[(
fˆ(~x,~y)(x
∗)− f(x∗)
)2]
+ η ·
∑
i
ei
)
, (2)
where for the purposes of the expectation we assume that, for all i ∈ W ′, yi = f(xi) + ǫi, where
ǫi is sampled according to worker i’s distribution when s/he exerts effort ei (which has mean 0 and
variance σi(ei)2);
3. extracts optimal worker surplus; in particular, the expected utility of every worker is 0 at the unique
dominant strategy equilibrium.
5We use the shorthand D∗ ,
⋃∞
i=1 D
i
, and similarly for R∗+.
6For instance, if fˆ is linear regression then
g(~x, F, ~σ) = Ex∗∼F
[
[(x∗)T, 1] · (XTX)−1XT · diag( ~σ2) ·X(XTX)−1 · [(x∗)T, 1]T
]
,
where X is the matrix whose rows are [xTi , 1] and diag( ~σ2) is the diagonal matrix whose (i, i) entry is σ2i .
7An estimator is not well-defined with one example less if omitting one example from its input makes the output of the estimator
undefined. For example, if fˆ is linear regression (for linear functions from Rn to R) restricted to take as input exactly n+1 examples
(xi, yi), then it is not well-defined with one example less, since n examples won’t suffice to produce an estimate.
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Notice that Quantity (2) clearly provides a lower bound to the objective value (1) of any solution to
ESW (and not just those inducing a unique dominant strategy equilibrium), evaluated at any (e∗i )i∈W ′ that
satisfies individual rationality. Indeed, by individual rationality for all workers combined,
E
[∑
i∈W ′
pi
(
(xj , yj(e
∗
j ))j∈W ′
)]
≥
∑
i
e∗i .
Hence, (1) ≥ (2). In fact, (2) corresponds to the objective value that one would achieve, if one could
dictate the effort level that each worker should exert and only paid workers exactly for the amount of effort
they exerted and not a cent more. So, in fact, Property 2 implies Property 3 in our theorem above. What
our theorem establishes is that there always exist solutions to ESW that induce a unique dominant strategy
equilibrium satisfying individual rationality, and that these solutions achieve the same objective value that a
dictator who could dictate the behavior of each worker would achieve. Even though we do not assume we
have such power, we still achieve the same objective value that such a powerful dictator would.
Proof of Theorem 1: We design a solution to ESW whose unique dominant strategy equilibrium ~e∗ satisfies
individual rationality, and achieves objective value (1) that equals Quantity (2). We have already argued that
if we do this, we immediately satisfy Properties 1, 2 and 3 in the statement of the theorem.
We define our solution to ESW in terms of an arbitrary optimal solution W ′, (xi, ei)i∈W ′ to the mini-
mization problem (2). In terms of this solution:
• We choose the same set of workers W ′ and assign to each i ∈ W ′ the point xi.
• It remains to define our payment commitments to the workers. To each worker i ∈W ′, we commit to
the payment:8
pi((~x, ~y)) = ci − di ·
(
yi − fˆ(~x,~y)−i(xi)
)2
, (3)
for some ci, di to be chosen. Notice that the payment to worker i depends also on the reports of the
other workers.
We now choose the constants (ci, di)i∈W ′ so that our solution induces a unique dominant strategy equilib-
rium ~e∗ that satisfies individual rationality (with equality) and also ~e∗ ≡ ~e, where ~e = (ei)i∈W ′ is as in
the solution to (2) that we have fixed. What is the expected payment to worker i if the workers exert some
arbitrary efforts ~e′? Denoting ~y(~e′) = (yi(e′i))i∈W ′ , we have:
E~y(~e′)[pi((~x, ~y(~e
′)))]
= ci − di · E~y(~e′)
[
(yi − f(xi))
2 +
(
f(xi)− fˆ(~x,~y)−i(xi)
)2
− 2 (yi − f(xi))
(
f(xi)− fˆ(~x,~y)−i(xi)
)]
= ci − di ·
(
σi(e
′
i)
2 + g(~x−i,1xi , ~σ−i(~e
′
−i))
)
,
where we used that our estimator fˆ is well-behaved, according to Definition 6, and the independence of
the estimation of worker i and the other workers. We denote by ~σ−i(~e′−i) = (σj(e′j))j 6=i, and by 1xi the
distribution that samples xi with probability 1. g is a known function determined by the estimator according
to Definition 6.
Since each worker i ∈ W ′ is assumed rational, aiming to maximize his expected payment minus ex-
erted effort, if the other workers exert effort levels ~e′−i, worker i’s best response is found by solving the
maximization problem:
max
e′i
(
ci − di ·
(
σi(e
′
i)
2 + g(~x−i,1xi , ~σ−i(~e
′
−i))
)
− e′i
)
. (4)
8For compactness, we denote by (~x, ~y) = (xi, yi)i∈W′ .
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Taking derivative with respect to e′i and setting to 0 gives the following condition for the optimum e∗i :
2diσi(e
∗
i ) · σ
′
i(e
∗
i ) + 1 = 0.
In order to ensure that e∗i ≡ ei, where ei was the effort level computed by solving (2), we set
di =
−1
2σi(ei)σ
′
i(ei)
.
Given that σi(·) is convex decreasing, our setting of di ensures that ei is the unique solution to (4).
So our choice of (di)i∈W ′ has made sure that the unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the game
among workers defined by our solution to ESW (regardless of the ci’s) is (ei)i∈W ′ . Now we set the ci’s so
that this equilibrium also satisfies individual rationality tightly. It suffices to choose, for each i ∈ W ′:
ci = di ·
(
σi(ei)
2 + g(~x−i,1xi , ~σ−i(~e−i))
)
+ ei.
This choice makes sure that the expected payment to each worker equals his effort. Hence, the unique
dominant strategy equilibrium of the game among workers defined by our solution to ESW is ~e and it
satisfies:
E
[∑
i∈W ′
pi
(
(xj , yj(ej))j∈W ′
)]
=
∑
i
ei.
Hence, the objective value (1) achieved by the unique dominant strategy equilibrium matches (2). This
concludes the proof of the theorem. 
3.1 The Computational Complexity of Our Algorithms
An important question is, of course, how the Statistician could arrive at the optimum mechanism in a compu-
tationally efficient manner. From the proof of Theorem 1, it is clear that the major computational overhead
is finding an optimal solution to the minimization problem (2). All the other steps of our algorithm can be
executed in polynomial time. In this section, we study the computational complexity of the minimization
problem (2).
A closely related problem to ours, optimal experiment design (ODE), has received lots of attention
in the Statistics community [20, 23, 24, 21, 25, 22, 37]. In ODE, the goal is also to find an optimal set
of regression vectors {xi} for estimation of their corresponding {f(xi)} such that a certain objective is
optimized. Depending on the objective, different criteria of optimality have been proposed e.g. A-optimality,
C-optimality, D-optimality etc.. However, unlike our model, the estimation error of f(xi) for any regression
vector xi in ODE is assumed to come from a fixed distribution, independent of the worker’s effort level.
Hence, our problem can be viewed as a generalization of ODE. In particular, it is straightforward to show
that the C-optimal ODE problem is a special case of ours. Unfortunately, even this special case is NP-hard
to solve exactly [46]. We propose two different approaches to address this computational intractability.
Robustness to Approximation. The first approach is to use an approximate solution to the minimization
problem (2) in our mechanism. It is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that our mechanism can set the
unique dominant strategy equilibrium to be any feasible solution of the minimization problem (2). Moreover,
the objective value (2) of our mechanism at this unique dominant strategy equilibrium equals the value of
the minimization problem (2) on that particular feasible solution. In short, our mechanism provides an
approximation preserving reduction from the ESW problem to the minimization problem (2). I.e. whenever
an α-factor approximation algorithm exists for (2), our technique translates that (in a black-box manner) to
an α-factor approximation algorithm for ESW.
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Optimal Assignment Problem. We may also consider a special case of the minimization problem (2),
where the set of regression vectors are predetermined but not assigned to the workers. Formally, we restrict
(2) to the following minimization problem:
min
W ′,(xi:=spi(i),ei)i∈W′
(
Ex∗,~y
[(
fˆ(~x,~y)(x
∗)− f(x∗)
)2]
+ η ·
∑
i
ei
)
, (5)
where ~s = (s1, . . . , sk) is a fixed set of regression vectors and π is a bijection from W ′ to [k]. We show that
if the well-behaved estimator fˆ is separable,9 the minimization problem (5) is solvable in polynomial time
via min-cost bipartite matching.
Definition 7. A well-behaved estimator fˆ for H, as in Definition 6, is separable iff there exists a function h,
such that, for all distributions F over D, functions f ∈ H, and vectors ~x ∈ D∗ and ~σ ∈ R∗+ (of the same
dimension as ~x):
E~y,x∗
[(
fˆ(~x,~y)(x
∗)− f(x∗)
)2]
=
∑
i
h(xi,X, F ) · σ
2
i ,
where X is the set of all xi’s, and for the purposes of the expectation on the left hand side x∗ ∼ F and,
independently for all i, yi = f(xi) + ǫi, where each ǫi is sampled from an arbitrary distribution of mean 0
and variance σ2i , (and when ~x is such that fˆ(~x,~y) is well-defined).
Theorem 2. Given a set of regression vectors ~s = (s1, . . . sk), and a separable estimatorfˆ for H, there is a
polynomial time algorithm for finding an optimal solution to the minimization problem (5).
Proof. We reduce the minimization problem to the min-cost bipartite matching problem. Let S be the set
of regression vectors in ~s, (W,T ) be a complete bipartite graph, such that W is the set of all workers and
T is the set of all regression vectors in S plus |W | − k dummy regression vectors. For any edge (i, j) with
j ∈ [k], the cost ci,j is minei h(sj , S, F ) · σi(ei)2 + η · ei. Since σi(ei) is a convex function, this cost can be
computed in polynomial time. For any edge incident to a dummy regression vector, the cost is 0.
Now consider (5). Since fˆ is a separable estimator, the minimization problem can be simplified as
min
W ′,(spi(i),ei)i∈W′
(∑
i
h(sπ(i), S, F ) · σi(ei)
2 + η ·
∑
i
ei
)
=min
W ′,π
∑
i∈W ′
min
ei
h(sπ(i), S, F ) · σi(ei)
2 + η · ei
=min
W ′,π
∑
i∈W ′
ci,πi .
The formula above wants to find a subset of workers W ′ and match them to the regression vectors in S,
such that the total cost is minimized. Notice that matching any worker to a dummy regression vector has
cost 0, therefore finding an optimal solution to the formula above is equivalent as finding a min-cost bipartite
matching in (W,T ). Given any min-cost bipartite matching M , we can construct an optimal solution to (5)
by assigning regression vector sj to j’s partner i in M . Since finding a min-cost bipartite matching takes
only polynomial time, (5) can also be solved in polynomial time.
9Linear regression, polynomial regression and finite-dimensional kernel regression are all separable.
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3.2 Discussion and Extensions
One of the conditions in Theorem 1 is that the estimator fˆ is well-defined with one example less. Without
it, we cannot hope for any interesting solutions to ESW. As a trivial example, suppose that fˆ is the unbiased
estimator of constant functions from R to R, which takes as input one example (x, y) and outputs y. In
this case fˆ is not well-defined with one example less, and no interesting solutions to ESW exist, since the
payments to a worker may only depend on his own report, and hence the worker will put the minimal effort
in set E , regardless of our payment, as long as our payment is at least that minimal effort. (Recall that,
since we never learn the unknown function f we cannot use it to penalize the worker.) In this example,
our constraint that fˆ is well-defined with one example less effectively says that we need to use at least two
workers for estimating constant functions from R to R.
We point out that this requirement can be removed in settings where the test point x∗ and the func-
tion value f(x∗) can be observed by the Statistician and the experts. We can then treat (x∗, f(x∗)) as an
additional example with zero variance, and modify (3) to include that example in fˆ .
Our condition that fˆ is well-behaved does not contain regularized estimators, such as ridge regression.
As ridge regression is biased, its mean square error also includes a bias term that depends on f . This could
create two potential problems for our mechanism. (i) As we do not know f , we can not possibly solve the
minimization problem (2) even if we are given infinite computational power. (ii) This term will also appear
in every worker’s expected payment (if we use payments as in (3)), and, since f is unknown, the workers
can’t evaluate their expected utilities exactly, and thus can’t decide if it’s beneficial for them to participate
in the mechanism. We point out that, under the assumption that the xi’s are fixed in advance (but the
Statistician is still allowed to optimally assign them to workers) our mechanism can address both problems
and accommodate ridge regression with only mild modifications. For problem (i), the mean square error of
ridge regression can be separated into two parts – the bias term and the variance term. The bias term depends
on f and the xi’s but is independent of the σi’s. This means that no matter how the samples are assigned
and how they are estimated, the bias term remains the same. So we only need to consider the variance term.
Luckily the variance does not depend on f , thus we can still find the optimal solution of the minimization
problem (2). For problem (ii), we can modify our payments. Roughly, we can use any unbiased estimator f˜
and add another term (fˆ − f˜)2 to the payment function (both estimators applied to the examples from the
other workers). The extra term will cancel the bias in expectation and will allow the workers to reason about
their optimal behavior even without knowing f . Note that the new term will introduce some extra terms in
the expected utility, but these only depend on known quantities such as the variances, and the worker will
be able to reason about his optimal behavior.
Although our objective function is stated as the weighted sum of mean square error and the total payment
in ESW, our mechanism can accommodate many variants of that objective function. In general, we can
modify the minimization problem (2) to reflect the new objective function. We can then apply our same
mechanism to enforce that the unique dominant strategy equilibrium is achieved at the optimal solution
of the new minimization problem. Here we list a few variants of our objective function and show how to
modify the minimization problem (2) accordingly.
Worker-specific scaling factor: An easy generalization is to replace the single scaling factor for the total
payment to worker-specific scaling factors in the objective. To accommodate this objective, we only need to
change the scaling factor for the sum of efforts to worker-specific scaling factors in (2).
Budget Constraints: A possible alternative objective is minimizing the mean square error subject to a
budget constraint for the total payment. For this objective, we update (2) to minimize the mean square error
subject to the constraint that the sum of all workers’ efforts is no greater than the budget.
Replacing the total payment with any increasing function of the payments: Another possible general-
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ization of our objective is to replace the total payment with any increasing function of the payments q(~p). In
this case, we update (2) to minimize the sum of mean square error plus q(~e).
Budget on any increasing function of the payments: We can also impose budget constraints on any
increasing function of the payments. For this objective, we modify (2) to minimize the mean square error
subject to the constraint that the increasing function over the workers’ efforts does not exceed the budgets.
Beyond Mean Square Error: Our techniques can be generalized to accommodate general error functions
beyond mean-square. If the function combined with the estimator are well-behaved, that is, it is independent
of the function f , then our techniques go through. We only need to modify (2) to minimize the weighted
sum of the new error function and the total effort.
References
[1] A. Badanidiyuru, R. Kleinberg, and A. Slivkins “Bandits with Knapsacks: Dynamic procurement for
crowdsourcing,” in [31]. 1.1
[2] D. F. Bacon, Y. Chen, I. Kash, D. C. Parkes, M. Rao, and M. Sridharan “Predicting your own effort,”
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2012. 1.1
[3] S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, and B. Sivan “Optimal crowdsourcing contests,” SODA 2012. 1.1
[4] X. Chen, Q. Lin and D. Zhou “Optimistic Knowledge Gradient Policy for Optimal Budget Allocation
in Crowdsourcing,” ICML 2013. 1.1
[5] X. Chen, P. N. Bennett, and K. Collins-Thompson “Pairwise ranking aggregation in a crowdsourced
setting,” WSDM, 2013.
[6] E. Clarke “Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public Choice, 11(1):1733, 1971. 1, 1.1
[7] A. Dasgupta and A. Ghosh “Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency,” Inter-
national conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 2013. 1.1
[8] O. Dekel, F. Fischer, and A. D. Procaccia “Incentive compatible regression learning,” Symposium on
Discrete algorithms (SODA), 2008. 1.1
[9] A. Doan, R. Ramakrishnan, and A. Y. Halevy “Crowdsourcing systems on the world-wide web,”
CACM 2011. 1
[10] F. Fang, M. Stinchcombe, and A. Whinston “Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is - A Betting
Platform for Better Prediction,” Review of Network Economics, 6(2), 2007. 1.1
[11] RPH Fishe, RP McAfee ”Nonlinear contracts, zero profits and moral hazard,” Economica, 1987. 1.1
[12] G. Goel, A. Nikzad, and A. Singla “Matching Workers Expertise with Tasks: Incentives in Heteroge-
neous Crowdsourcing Markets,” in [31]. 1.1
[13] T. Groves “Incentives in teams,” Econometrica, 41(4):617631, 1973. 1, 1.1
[14] C. Ho, A. Slivkins, and J. Wortman-Vaughan “Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing,” in [31].
1.1
[15] T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman “The Elements of Statistical Learning,” Springer-Verlag, New
York, 2001 1.1
13
[16] J. Horton and L. Chilton “The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing,” EC 2010. 1.1
[17] ICML 2013 Worskhop: Machine Learning Meets Crowdsourcing,
http://www.ics.uci.edu/
˜
qliu1/MLcrowd_ICML_workshop/ 38, 40, 43
[18] N. Immorlica, G. Stoddard, and V. Syrgkanis “Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges,” in
[31]. 1.1
[19] S. Ioannidis and P. Loiseau “Linear regression as a non-cooperative game,” Web and Internet Eco-
nomics (WINE), 2013. 1.1
[20] J. Kieffer. “Optimal Experiment Designs, (with discussion),” J. Roy. Statist. Soc. B. 272-319, 1959.
3.1
[21] J. Kieffer. “Optimum designs in regression problems,” II. Ann. Math. Statist. 32 298-325, 1961. 3.1
[22] J.Kieffer. “General equivalence theory for optimum designs (approximate theory),” Ann. Statist. 2
849-879, 1974. 3.1
[23] J. Kieffer and J. Wolfowitz. “Optimum designs in regression problems,” Ann. Math. Statist. 30 271-
294, 1959 3.1
[24] J. Kieffer and J. Wolfowitz. “The equivalence of two extremum problems, ” Canad.J.Math. 14 363-366,
1960. 3.1
[25] J. Kieffer and J. Wolfowitz. “On a theorem of Hoel and Levine on extrapolation,” Ann.
Math.Statist3.61627-1655, 1965. 3.1
[26] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford university press,
1995. 1.1
[27] R. Meir, A. D. Procaccia, and J. S. Rosenschein “Strategyproof Classification under Constant Hypothe-
ses: A Tale of Two Functions,” AAAI, 2008. 1.1
[28] R. Meir, A. D. Procaccia, and J. S. Rosenschein “Strategyproof Classification with Shared Inputs,”
IJCAI, 2009. 1.1
[29] N. Miller, P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser. ”Eliciting informative feedback: The peer-prediction
method.” Management Science 51.9 (2005): 1359-1373. 1.1
[30] S. Nath, P. Dayama, D. Garg, and Y. Narahari “Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical
task execution via crowdsourcing,” Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2012. 1.1
[31] NIPS 2013 Woskshop on Croudsourcing: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications,
http://www.ics.uci.edu/
˜
qliu1/nips13_workshop/. 1, 12, 14, 18, 36, 39
[32] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani (eds.) “Algorithmic Game Theory,” Cambridge
University Press, 2007. 1, 1.1
[33] R. Nix and M. Kantarciouglu “Incentive compatible privacy-preserving distributed classification,”
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 9(4): 451–462, 2012. 1.1
[34] R. Myerson “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):5873, 1981. 1
[35] D. DiPalantino and M. Vojnovic “Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions,” EC 2009. 1.1
14
[36] G. Patterson, G. Van Horn, S. Belongie, P. Perona, and J. Hays “Bootstrapping Fine-Grained Classi-
fiers: Active Learning with a Crowd in the Loop,” in [31].
[37] F. Pukelsheim. “Optimal Design of Experiments,” Wiley & Sons, 1993. 3.1
[38] V. Rajan, S. Bhattacharya, L. Celis, D. Chander, K. Dasgupta and S. Karanam “CrowdControl: An
online learning approach for optimal task scheduling in a dynamic crowd platform,” in [17] 1.1
[39] P. Ruvolo, J. Whitehill and J. Movellan “Exploiting Commonality and Interaction Effects in Crowd-
sourcing Tasks Using Latent Factor Models,” in [31]. 1.1
[40] S. Sabato and A. Kalai “Feature Multi-Selection among Subjective Features,” in [17]. 1.1
[41] Y. Singer and M. Mittal “Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets,” WWW 2013. 1.1
[42] A. Singla and A. Krause “Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mech-
anisms,” WWW 20131. 1.1
[43] A. Singla and A. Krause “Truthful Incentives for Privacy Tradeoff: Mechanisms for Data Gathering in
Community Sensing,” in [17] 1.1
[44] T. Jaakkola “Lecture Notes of Machine Learning”
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science/6-867-machine-learning-fall-2006/lecture-notes/lec5.pdf
1
[45] W. Vickrey “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders,” The Journal of Finance,
16(1):837, 1961. 1, 1.1
[46] M.Cerny, and M. Hladik. “Two complexity results on c-optimality in experimental design,” Computa-
tional Optimization and Applications 51, 13971408, 2012. 3.1
15
